Contradictions continue to surround the historical intersection of Anglo-American capitalism and slavery. The contested relationship between free-trade ideology and transatlantic abolitionism sits high among them. This historiographical essay seeks to ideas. For example, while granting that antebellum abolitionists "generally adhered to free trade economic ideas, sometimes radically so," James L. Huston has argued that "abolitionists possessed a biblical political economy, not a classical liberal one," a moral impulse that became diluted from the 1830s to the 1850s (2000, p. 488; 1990, p. 614).
2 trace the many-and often conflicting-economic ideological interpretations of the transatlantic abolitionist impulse, including the understudied transnational role of Victorian free-trade ideology. By expanding the survey beyond the national level, the essay suggests as well that long-standing conceptions of free-trade ideology and abolitionism need reconsideration.
The transatlantic connection between economic ideology and abolitionism remains unsettled. From the American side, this has arisen in part because there is no consensus concerning the ideological motivations of American abolitionists.
1 Some historians have suggested that American abolitionists did not subscribe to classical liberal ideas. For example, while granting that antebellum abolitionists "generally adhered to free trade economic ideas, sometimes radically so," James L. Huston has argued that "abolitionists possessed a biblical political economy, not a classical liberal one," a moral impulse that became diluted from the 1830s to the 1850s (2000, p. 488; 1990, p. 614) .
2
Paul Goodman has similarly portrayed American abolitionism as an oppositional religious response to the era's relatively unregulated capitalist marketplace: "Abolition was a struggle to impose on social and economic relations the moral principles that were rooted in Christian teachings" (1998, pp. xiv, 140) . The typical evangelical historiographical tradition goes even further than these interpretations in suggesting that 1 For the wide variation in interpretations, see also Huston (2000 and 1990) .
2 K. R. M. Short, examining the English intersection of Christianity and antislavery, has drawn similar conclusions; British free trade was "firmly wed to anti-slavery," and contained "a decidedly religious imprimatur" (1965-66, p. 313) . 3
American abolitionists were Christian reformers whose evangelical morality was in inherent opposition to market capitalism. suggested that the peaceable elements of market transactions sparked a new-found humanitarian sympathy that led to abolitionism. This resultant sense of marketplace responsibility was then extended to a moralistic northeastern sense of responsibility to bring an end to American slavery (Haskell 1985 and 1985b) . 5 For others, the 3 See, for instance, Hart (1906, pp. 15, 181, 320); Loveland (1966); Stewart (1976); Mathews (1965); Wyatt-Brown (1969); McKivigan (1984) ; Schriver (1970); Lesick (1980) . For earlier, more critical, evangelical interpretations, see Barnes (1933, pp. 3-16), and Randall (1940) . 4 See, for instance, Ashworth (1995, pp. 131-181) , Davis (1987) , Davis (1975 , pp. 45-47), Temperley (1980 . 5 See also Ashworth (1987) . This interpretation bears some similarity to that of Seymour Drescher concerning the British marketplace. Although granting laissez-faire capitalism and abolitionism were 4 predominantly middle-class abolitionists in the United States subscribed to an economic individualism and anti-institutionalism that at times bordered upon anarchism (Perry 1973; Elkins 1958, pp. 147-157; Forster 2014) . For these and many other scholarly works, abolitionists' extreme laissez-faire capitalist ideas consequently led to strained relations with labor unions. 6 Studies of nineteenth-century contract law, in turn, have emphasized the classical liberal motivations of abolitionism (Stanley 1998) , and economic historians have only just begun to re-explore the close connection-rather than opposition-between antebellum tariff debates, transatlantic abolitionism, and religious revivalism (Meardon 2008 ).
On the British side of the abolitionist-free trade debate, too, we run into a historiographical quagmire. The questioning of the humanitarian impulse of British abolitionists can, of course, be traced back to the influential work of Eric Williams (1944) , who acknowledged the confluence of free-trade ideology and abolitionism in
England, but also suggested that declining profits from the transatlantic slave system, not humanitarianism, brought about the end of the British slave trade and Caribbean slavery in the early nineteenth century. This humanitarianism-in-decline motif remains a point of closely connected, Drescher has contended that the market per se did not create the abolitionist humanitarian impulse; working-class social relations also played a big role, as did the rise of evangelism.
According to Drescher, British abolitionism was thus born more out of a non-Marxist class struggle stemming from the antebellum capitalist market at moments of high national confidence and optimism, rather than from purely economic relationships or ideology (Drescher 1986 and 2012) . 6 See, for instance, Bender, Davis, Haskell, and Ashworth (1992); Foner (1980); Cunliffe (1979); Searle (1998, pp. 64-67) ; Nye (1963, pp. 246-247) ; Schmidt (1998); Gerteis (1987, pp. xiv, 63-65); Glickstein (1979) ; Kraditor (1970, pp. 246-255); Lofton (1948); Fladeland (1984, pp. viii-xi); McKinvigan (1999 The transatlantic role of abolitionist consumers in the early-to mid-nineteenthcentury marketplace has therefore played a sizeable role in adding to the historiographical confusion surrounding free-trade ideology and abolitionism. For example, the American Free Produce Movement of the 1820s and 1830s at first glance might also be viewed as a protectionist-abolitionist movement, owing to its attempt to boycott slave-produced goods and to encourage instead the consumption of "free labor" goods. But even here, it gets murky, because, as Lawrence B. Glickman points out, the leaders of the movement were also supporters of a "truly free market" that would show free labor to be less expensive and more efficient than slave labor (2004, pp. 894-895, 898 (Sussman 2000, p. 188) and "the framework of a liberal political economy" (Turley 1991, p. 149) , in the long term, at least (Tyrrell 1987, p. 140) . And Cobdenites numbered among the leading transatlantic abolitionists.
Through a transatlantic exploration of Victorian Cobdenism, rather than the more commonly studied Jeffersonian free-trade tradition of southern slave owners, the classical liberal intersection with abolitionism becomes more pronounced. The fact that, until at least the 1860s, some of the most prominent transatlantic Cobdenites were a regular who's who of radical abolitionists has, until recently, received surprisingly little attention 9 See also Searle (1998, pp. 61-63 14 See, for instance, Temperley (1972, pp. 192-193) ; Turley (1991, p. 126); Fladeland (1972, chs. 10-11) ; 12 movement will give us the West. 1840 , in Dumond (1938 Meardon (2008, pp. 268, 273-275, 285-295); Crapol (1986, pp. 92-102) . 16 Emancipator, 1 May 1840, p. 2; Davis (1990, p. 171) ; Morgan (2009, p. 95); Martin (1928 Martin ( ,1935 Martin ( , and 1941 . 13 1865, and would become an early leader of the subsequent Gilded Age American freetrade movement. 17 Foner (1995, p. 153); Free-Trader (March 1870): 170; Bigelow (1890, pp. 182-183) .
18 Stebbins (1890, p. 194 Friedman (1980); Friedman (1982) ; Huston (1990, p. 615) . 15 liberalism; still more by some combination therein. These disparities do suggest that historians should avoid attempting to completely align a particular economic ideology with anti-slavery, be it market fundamentalism or market loathing. They should accept that there were multiple ideological conceptions of anti-slavery, much as there were multiple conceptions of liberty (Huzzey 2014) .
Second is the common tendency to halt studies of transatlantic abolitionism in (Slap 2006; Palen 2013 Palen , 2014b Palen , and 2015 . The reformists' laissez-faire faith would correspondingly shift from freeing men to liberalizing American trade. It is here, rather than in the antebellum era, that the case might more persuasively be made that free-trade advocacy led to a declining humanitarian interest in civil liberties for freedmen and freedwomen, as the moralistic condemnation of these former abolitionists shifted from the plight of former slaves to what they considered to be the protectionist enslavement of American trade.
Fourth is the common tendency to assume that antebellum abolitionist ideas arose within a national vacuum. 22 The global turn within the history of capitalism and abolitionism offers numerous ways of surmounting this historiographical stumbling block. 23 Bringing together the global history of capitalism with the global history of ideas (Moyn 2014 ) certainly looks promising. Comparative approaches to the historical intersection of economic ideology and nineteenth-century abolitionism could similarly 22 Huston previously observed this parochial turn: that it was "highly unsettling" how intellectual histories of anti-slavery have "focused so closely upon particular aspects of northern culture" as to suggest that the American abolitionist movement "sprang entirely from internal northern developments" (Huston 1990, pp. 609, 619-620 
